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ABSTRACT Clear and pressing needs for many kinds of work have declined 
steadily since the mid-1970s in Western countries, and the declines show no sign 
of stopping. In the United States today, for example, roughly 7 million prime 
working-age men no longer seek work and are officially outside the labor force, 
with increasing numbers of formerly employed women joining them. Policy-making 
elites in Western countries have been myopic about problems of work in advanced 
postindustrial conditions and how they lead to the kind of demagogic populism 
personified by Donald Trump, AfD leaders in Germany, Marine Le Pen in France, 
Geert Wilders in the Netherlands, Beppe Grillo in Italy, and leaders and parties 
in at least two of the four Visegrad countries. The declining need for work and 
populist exploitations of employment insecurities and fears it produces threaten 
the elite basis of stable political systems in the West and give rise to an apparition 
of deep and protracted civil strife.    
KEYWORDS: Financial meltdown; declining needs for work; employment 
insecurities; myopic elites, demagogic populists; insiders and outsiders; challenges 
to political stability
Starting during the 1970s and becoming increasingly apparent over the past four 
decades, nearly all Anglo-American and European Union countries have displayed 
structural problems and experienced growing external threats that elites may not 
be able to contain and manage. The structural problems arise most fundamentally 
from an inability to provide for the useful employment of all persons who cannot, 
unlike the very young and the very old, be incontestably treated as entitled to 
community support. Three circumstances underlie these problems:
1. Because the bulk of employment has become organizationally sophisticated 
and much of it substantially technical, large bodies of culturally disadvantaged 
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people in Western countries – rural dwellers and rural-to-urban migrants, 
immigrants from outside the West, persons and groups discriminated against on 
racial, ethnic, gender, religious or other grounds – cannot secure anything more 
than precarious and poorly paid employment. They tend to become endemically 
idle and dependent on what amounts to begging or banditry. 
2. Among educated Westerners who succeed in finding reasonably satisfactory 
ways of participating in occupational and community life, there is a general 
desire to be consulted and involved in decision-making – so as not to feel 
“governed” by others – and this increasingly makes  the managerial functions 
and decisions of elites difficult to execute.
3. Younger Westerners in general have inadequate involvements with the 
working life and the public life of their countries. A large proportion experience 
indulged or forced leisure but lack a realistic prospect of being able to sustain 
leisure throughout their lives. 
External threats to Western countries arise most fundamentally from the 
severe disjunction between their politics and politics in most other parts of the 
world. Free and stable political institutions – competitive elections, tolerance 
of dissenting views, wide personal liberties – are largely confined to Western 
countries. Irregular seizures of governing power, military rule, autocracy, and 
scant respect for political institutions are the persisting forms of politics in the 
bulk of non-Western countries, as they were in most Western countries from 
the times they emerged as nation-states until well into the twentieth century 
(Higley – Burton 2006). 
It is clear that attempts to implant free and stable institutions in countries 
outside the West have not generally succeeded. This means that a substantial 
spread of stable representative political systems beyond the relatively few 
non-Western countries that have them is unlikely. For the foreseeable future, 
Western countries will live in a world comprised mainly of countries with forms 
of politics quite different from their own. Many of these countries deeply resent 
the advantaged situations of Western countries, and some will undertake or 
encourage vengeful retributions. It is an open question, moreover, if serious and 
sustained economic development can occur in countries amid disorderly, often 
violent politics. I have examined these and other external threats to Western 
countries elsewhere (Higley 2016). In this article I concentrate on the crisis to 
which basic structural problems in Western countries have led. 
This crisis stems most immediately from the 2008-09 financial meltdown 
and ineffective policy responses to it by governing elites (Blinder 2013; Wolf 
2014; Best – Higley 2014). That the meltdown was a turning point in Western 
countries is by now evident. In response, governing elites in Germany, France, 
the Netherlands, and other northern Euro-zone countries refused to allow 
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a genuine banking and transfer union that would ameliorate deep recessions 
in southern Euro-zone countries. They decided, instead, to insist on austerity 
policies that aggravated and prolonged the crisis. Across the Atlantic, the 
governing Democratic Party leadership in Washington opted for Keynesian 
deficit spending to recover from the meltdown, but congressional approval of 
a spending program large enough to pull the economy out of recession could 
not be obtained. During eight years on both sides of the Atlantic, economic 
recovery was barely noticeable, high unemployment rates were persistent, 
underemployment in the form of part-time and temporary jobs was widespread. 
As a consequence of large-scale purchases of bonds and other financial 
securities in desperate attempts to stimulate their economies through 
“quantitative easing,” the US Federal Reserve, the European Central Bank, the 
Bank of England, and the Swiss and Swedish central banks now hold a fifth 
of their governments’ total debts, four times the proportion owned by them 
before the financial meltdown (Financial Times, 14 August 2017). Though 
not precipitated by the meltdown, mass migrations, principally to Europe, of 
people fleeing violence, joblessness, disease, shortages of food and water, and 
dire effects of climate change in non-Western countries have exacerbated and 
enflamed a feeling of crisis. 
Political effects of the crisis have included the splintering or weakening of 
major political parties; anti-immigrant mobilizations on the right and anti-
globalization mobilizations on the left; the British referendum vote against 
continued EU membership; the EU’s substantial political paralysis; controversial 
bailouts of financial institutions in southern Euro-zone countries; governments 
with authoritarian tendencies in several East European countries belonging to 
the EU; the shocking presidential victory of Donald Trump and his installation 
of a stridently populist-nationalist administration in the United States; fears of a 
similar development in European countries; savage terrorist attacks on civilians 
in European and North American cities and towns by fanatics. Parallels between 
the crisis and what occurred in Western countries during the 1920s and 1930s 
may be overdrawn, but not greatly. 
A deepening division in Western populations created by the steady diminution 
in clear and pressing needs for many kinds of work is the underlying cause. In 
the Journal’s inaugural issue in 2010, I analyzed this division in some detail 
(Higley 2010). I want to extend my analysis of eight years ago by examining 
what has happened since.
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DECLINING NEEDS FOR WORK
In postindustrial conditions, the populations of Western countries divide 
increasingly into two broad interest and attitude camps that cut across the 
social classes and strata so prominent during the industrial and pre-industrial 
phases of Western history. One camp, which I term insiders, consists of persons 
who are, or who have recently been, more or less satisfactorily employed, plus 
their generally comfortable dependents. However, automation, globalization, 
and environmental constraints push increasing numbers of these insiders – 
especially manufacturing workers, miners, and retail service workers – toward 
the fringes of labor markets where they experience lowered living standards 
and little prospect of regaining satisfactory employment. Pressures on them are 
reflected in decreasing life expectancies due to “diseases of despair”: alcoholism, 
narcotics addiction, opioid usage, and suicide (Case – Deacon 2017). 
Consider the United States. Ten years after the financial meltdown, the rate of 
annual economic growth (GDP) has yet to match, let alone exceed, its average 
rate of 2.0 percent between 1820 and 2012, a rate that slowed to less than 1.5 
percent between 1990 and 2012 (Piketty 2014: pp. 96-97). In an important book, 
Men Without Work, economist Nicolas Eberstadt reports that during 2015 on a 
monthly average, 22 percent of men in the U.S. between the ages of 20 and 65 
had no paying job of any kind, and in conditions of “full employment” during 
2016, one of every six men in the historically prime working ages of 25-54 had 
no paying job, which was down from one in sixteen during the 1980s (2016: p. 
22). In terms of working-age male participation in its labor force, by 2015 the 
U.S. ranked twenty-second among the OECD’s twenty-three original member 
countries; only Italy ranked lower (2016:  p. 51). The US Bureau of Labor 
Statistics projects that by 2020 freelance and temporary workers, day laborers, 
contract workers, and others performing “on-demand” and “gig economy” jobs 
will comprise 40 percent of the officially defined labor force (MBO Partners 
2015). 
The other camp in postindustrial Western populations, outsiders, consists of 
persons in conditions of poverty or other disadvantaged circumstances who are 
without marketable work skills or, at least, without the attitudes necessary for 
regular employment in complex organizational and sophisticated technological 
work environments, together with their often numerous dependents. Having 
little or no stake in the existing organization of work and small chances if 
obtaining one, outsiders and their dependents are sustained by public handouts 
or the proceeds of dubiously legal or openly illegal undertakings. They harbor 
discontents and voice demands that are essentially non-negotiable because they 
have little or nothing to lose by pursuing demands in unrestrained ways. The 
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most important leverage outsiders have is threats to disrupt the locales in which 
they live. This is the central message of terrorist actions, bloody confrontations 
with police and other public authorities, and periodic riots involving the pillage 
and destruction of private property and public facilities in many Western cities 
and towns. 
The insider-outside division in postindustrial Western countries is an 
inescapable reality that cannot be rectified by known policies. No matter how 
generous, welfare states and panoplies of expensive programs of aid have been 
unable to keep the division from widening and deepening. Nor, contrary to what 
conservative political forces have preached, is it possible to force outsiders into 
employment, when the fact is that their labor and thought is not needed for 
economic productivity. In view of high technology in Western economies and 
low-cost production processes in other parts of the world, outsiders are surplus 
persons not needed for the performance of essential work tasks. 
MYOPIC ELITES
By “elites” I mean individuals and small, relatively cohesive and stable groups 
holding commanding positions in a country’s most important institutions and 
organizations and able to affect major political outcomes decisively. At the 
national level in Western countries, and depending on methods of identifying 
them, elites in this defined sense consist of several thousand key decision-
makers in political, governmental, business, media, military, trade union, and 
other important institutions and organizations (Best – Higley 2017). Elites in all 
Western countries confront serious problems of work (except where adventitious 
circumstances such as Norway’s petroleum or Australia’s minerals bounty 
intervene), but I focus on the most important Western countries. 
The strong postindustrial tendency to strip away employment security 
and aggravate unemployment and underemployment has been difficult to 
grasp intellectually. Throughout the twentieth century’s second half, elites 
and intellectuals in Western countries were preoccupied with ways in which 
economic experience discredited various collectivist doctrines that appealed 
to many humane and sympathetic people in earlier times (Fukuyama 2012). 
It became undeniable not only under state socialism in the Soviet Union and 
China, but more widely in Latin America and in East and South Asia, that in 
basic matters of production – whether agricultural, industrial, or bureaucratic 
and service – efficient economic performance depends upon making substantial 
appeals to the individual self-interests of owners, managers, and workers. 
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This made examining declining needs for work in postindustrial conditions 
awkward because doing so could easily invite charges of hostility toward a 
system, capitalism, incomparably more productive than any other. Capitalism’s 
demonstrable superiority over socialism greatly expanded the ranks and prestige 
of true-believing capitalists among political, business, and intellectual elites 
who championed a “free market” as the solution to most problems. Subjecting 
capitalist practices and outcomes, especially the declining need for many kinds 
of work, to close and critical scrutiny was decidedly out of favor. Faith in free 
markets, privatization, lower taxes on business and consumers, and as little 
government regulation as possible had always been strong in Western countries. 
But it acquired new intensity with the ascendance of neo-liberals in political and 
business elites, and their partial ascendance in media and intellectual elites from 
the 1980s onwards. 
The dogged faith in free markets and neo-liberal nostrums is shaken by the 
greatly reduced and nebulous need for labor and the consequent precariousness 
of much employment. This was the larger significance of the financial meltdown 
and its lengthy after effects. Like no other domestic event since World War II, 
the financial crisis and aftermath crystallized and manifested the basic problem 
of disappearing jobs and insecure employment, while also revealing the self-
serving nature of the claim that unfettered markets are naturally efficient and 
self-regulating. During the years of financial crisis and slow recovery, one could 
plausibly hypothesize that less myopic elite outlooks than those celebrating 
capitalism and touting how free markets always put things right would emerge. 
By and large, however, this has not happened. Instead, elites now find themselves 
in battles with populist leaders and movements. As exemplified by the political 
triumph of Donald Trump and factions supporting his election in 2016 and the 
political and administrative chaos that followed his entrance into the White 
House in January 2017, even more myopic outlooks are ascending and creating 
profound disjunctions among elites. 
POPULIST DEMAGOGUERY 
The insider-outsider division underlies the spread of demagogic populism 
in many Western countries. Promises to protect or restore the employment 
of insiders, keep outsiders at bay, arrest and deport alien migrants, and erect 
barriers against further migration lend themselves to demagoguery. Populist 
appeals for public support entail flagrant lies, preposterous policy promises, and 
ruthless accusations of treachery and conspiracy by governing elites. Populist 
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leaders create tightly organized camps possessing large financial resources 
and capacities for manipulating mass and social media. They portray electoral 
contests in winner-take-all terms, seek to politicize judiciaries, and engage in 
plebiscitary mobilizations of support by claiming to represent “the people” 
against opponents and critics who are labeled “enemies of the people.”  In their 
mobilizations, populist leaders harp on patriotic, religious, and ethnic identities 
that leave little room for political compromise. 
From the standpoint of elite theory and analysis, populist demagoguery is 
at odds with the restrained partisanship and operational code of “politics as 
bargaining” instead of “politics as war” that constitute the sine qua non of stable 
political institutions (Higley – Burton 2006, pp. 10-13; Higley 2016, pp. 20-
28). In the U.S., unrestrained demagoguery by Donald Trump catapulted an 
intellectually vacuous and highly erratic individual into the presidency. The 
manner in which Trump assembled a narrow majority of votes in the antique 
Electoral College, despite losing the popular vote, and peremptory actions 
by his White House, cabinet, and agency appointees have torn the fabric of 
restrained elite partisanship. In an early-morning “tweet storm” on 3 March 
2017, for example, Trump alleged, without a shred of evidence, that his 
predecessor, Barrack Obama, had ordered the secret wire-tapping of Trump 
Tower in New York City days before the November 2016 election – an allegation 
without precedent in modern American presidential history. During the first 
year of Trump’s chaotic presidency, large segments of the political and other 
elites became bent on expelling him from office, an effort that in its breadth has 
hitherto been unknown. Indications of collusion between Trump’s associates 
and Russian intelligence organizations to sway the November 2016 election in 
Trump’s favor are the focus of a criminal investigation by a special counsel 
and the FBI, with parallel investigations conducted by several congressional 
committees. The outcome may be a constitutional hemorrhaging greater than 
the Watergate imbroglio. 
In the United Kingdom, the June 2016 referendum on EU membership, 
which David Cameron had promised two years before to appease internal 
party opponents, stop the rise of the UK Independence Party, and keep himself 
in 10 Downing Street, created deep elite fissures and a surfeit of populist 
demagoguery. Factions favoring Britain’s continued membership in the EU 
forecast economic calamity if it exited; populist factions forecast the arrival of 
millions of Muslim migrants if membership continued. The former appealed to 
securely employed insiders in the prosperous south of England for support; the 
latter directed appeals to insecurely employed and recently unemployed insiders 
located in economically ravaged cities and towns in the Midlands and northern 
regions. Each side questioned the other’s motives and patriotism, and scurrilous 
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accusations suffused the referendum campaign. After a narrow majority voted 
against continued EU membership, the Labour Party became further radicalized 
and fractured, for a time the Liberal Party all but disappeared, Parliament was 
temporarily neutered as regards approving terms for exiting the EU, and the 
UK’s future as an intact national state became more uncertain.
In other Western countries, demagogic appeals for the support of insecure 
insiders bring populist-nationalist parties and movements closer to power. After 
heightening Dutch insiders’ anxieties about Islam, asylum-seeking refugees, the 
national loyalties of resident Turks and Moroccans, and temporary employment 
more widespread than in any other EU country, Geert Wilders’ Party of Freedom 
gained five seats in the March 2017 election to become the second largest party 
in parliament. In France, the party system imploded. Despite her National Front 
holding only two seats in the National Assembly, Marine Le Pen won 40 percent 
of the vote in the May 2016 presidential election, and Emmanuel Macron, the 
leader of a movement formed barely a year before, won the presidency, albeit 
with a historically unprecedented third of all voters abstaining or spoiling their 
ballots. In cahoots with arch-demagogue Silvio Berlusconi, Beppe Grillo’s 
populist Five Star Movement is now one of Italy’s two largest parties, while the 
second largest party in Sweden’s Riksdag is the anti-immigrant, anti-EU Sweden 
Democrats. In Germany’s September 2017 federal election, the xenophobic AfD 
party received some 6 million votes and entered the Bundestag as the third 
largest party. In Austria, a leader of the anti-immigrant Freedom Party came 
within a whisker of winning the presidency in December 2016. In Poland, 
Jaroslaw Kaczynski’s governing Law and Justice Party enflames religious and 
rural-urban cleavages, politicizes the judiciary, and harasses journalists and 
media critical of the government. In Hungary, Viktor Orbán, Fidesz, and Jobbik 
act in similar fashion. Populist-nationalist parties and governments in the four 
Visegrad countries have withered the alliance to the point where it no longer 
plays a stabilizing role in the region (Pakulski 2016).
CONCLUSIONS
It is obvious that unhappiness, unrest, and the distrust of constituted authority 
have spread ominously in Western countries since the financial meltdown ten 
years ago. Separately in degrees that vary from country to country according 
to national circumstances, but collectively across Europe and the Atlantic, 
elites and countries are in crisis. Because the fundamental structural problems 
they confront, which center principally on declining needs for many kinds of 
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jobs, have no known policy solutions, and because rising populist-nationalist 
forces are singularly ill-equipped and disinclined to recognize and deal with 
this reality, there is little question that a protracted period of exceptionally 
acrimonious, crisis-ridden politics is in store. 
During modern Western history, politics rested on steady increases in 
material productivity. Citizens and interest groups were allotted portions of 
a material increment at no great expense to other citizens and groups, and 
politics were not in this respect a zero-sum game. However, recent economic 
performance signals that there is no longer much of an increment to distribute 
in an essentially positive-sum way. Together with the declining need for many 
kinds of jobs, this is why discontent spreads. Demagogic populist-nationalist 
leaders and movements profit from this discontent and undermine a restrained 
politics. 
To contain and manage this, elites in Western countries must find ways to 
make a stable, instead of a progressing, living standard acceptable to most 
persons and groups. They must coax and coerce their populations back toward 
the social cohesion that enables citizens to count upon accustomed and expected 
behaviors by fellow citizens. This amounts to supposing that elites have the 
ingenuity to temper discontents that arise from the insider-outsider division. 
If I list a few of the policy tasks that elites will have to undertake, they include 
regularizing the treatment of outsiders who lack employment, perhaps by 
instituting a universal guaranteed minimum income; expanding ecological, 
environmental, resource conservation, and human service occupations and 
jobs to check the further spread of unemployment and underemployment; 
inhibiting large in-migrations by non-Western peoples to also check this spread; 
discouraging population growth in order to attain an eventual balance between 
the number of people wanting work and the amounts and kinds of work that are 
actually needed; above all, avert environmental disaster. 
One must not be sanguine about the difficulties of containing and managing 
a long-lasting crisis in advanced post-industrial conditions. It is useless, for 
example, to set the problem of idle and surplus outsiders aside by merely 
observing that technological achievements make necessary labor light by 
historical standards. Some tasks must still, and presumably must always, be 
performed with diligence, care, and forethought. Those who perform them – 
secure insiders – will not readily allow what they consider to be disproportionate 
rewards to any large body of more or less idle and vituperative outsiders.
One can only hope that the elite ingenuity that handled serious problems 
and conflicts in earlier, less affluent Western countries will eventually contain 
and manage the insider-outside division. But what if elites fail to do so? Most 
probably, they would be displaced by new elites prepared to ignore practices 
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of internal cooperation and political restraint in order to promote the interests 
of insecure insiders through measures that truncate liberal democracy and 
destabilize its institutions. Harbingers of such elites and the illiberal, unstable 
political systems they would create are not hard to discern at present. If the crisis 
deepens and proves utterly unmanageable, all bets will be off. As yet, however, 
there is no firm basis for believing that established elites will be unable to carry 
out the operations of politics necessary to contain and manage the crisis, while 
at the same time perpetuating their own statuses. The crisis is formidable, but it 
does not, at least not yet, appear likely to destroy existing elites.  
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